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Summary 
The shift from the Pharmaceutical Pricing Regulation Scheme to Value Based Pricing 
(VBP) is an important change in the way that medicines will be priced, and consequently, 
reimbursed in the United Kingdom.  Whilst the opportunity to purchase new medicines 
based on value to society is one that should be welcomed, we should proceed with 
caution.  We highlight ten issues that should be considered relating to innovation, the role 
and meaning of funding threshold and the adjustments to reflect burden of illness, 
therapeutic innovation and improvement and wider societal factors. 
Most importantly, the assessment of value should continue to be based on the 
characteristics of the displaced activities (e.g. the health produced).  To a large extent, all 
that is changing under VBP are the characteristics being considered; weighted health 
rather than unweighted health.  In addition, we should not totally abandon a cost-utility 
framework for appraisal just because its current formulation does not match the wider 
perspective now desired by government.   
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1. Introduction 
The current Pharmaceutical Pricing Regulation Scheme (PPS) was reviewed by the 
Office of Fair Trading in 2007 which recommended the introduction of Value Based 
Pricing (VBP) and this is scheduled to start on 1st January 2014 (OFT 2007).  The 
objectives of the proposed VBP scheme as set out on page 11 of the Department of 
Health’s consultation document (Department of Health 2010) are to: 
a) improve outcomes for patients;  
b) stimulate innovation;  
c) improve the transparency and predictability of decision-making;  
d) include a wide assessment of the range of factors through which medicines 
deliver benefits for patients and society;  
e) ensure value for money and best use of NHS resources 
 
The purpose of the consultation document is to gather opinion on the principles and 
practicalities of the scheme as set out in 20 questions.  The purpose of this paper is not to 
give a point-by-point response to all 20 questions as others are much better placed to 
answer some of the more process orientated questions.  Instead, we aim to highlight 
issues that we feel have been sidelined in the flurry of opinion about VBP, but which are 
apparent to us from our perspective as academic health economists with experience of 
economic evaluation, health technology assessment, benefit valuation and other related 
topics. 
In particular, we focus on objectives (b) and (d), as these represent the greatest departure 
from the current NICE Technology Appraisal (TA) process.  Indeed, one could argue that 
(a), (c) and (e) are already addressed by the current process; the NICE TA process is 
already the most transparent reimbursement process in the world and is widely regarded 
the world over as examining effectiveness and cost-effectiveness in a robust manner.  The 
current process, however, does not cover all patented medicines and so its coverage is 
incomplete.  It should also be noted that innovation and other factors are included within 
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the current TA process (NICE TA Guidelines 2008) although the influence they have on 
decisions is not as pronounced as some may wish it to be (Kennedy 2009). 
 
2.  Innovation 
Issue 1: Innovation in itself should not be rewarded  
This issue was considered in the OFT report on pharmaceutical pricing and categorically 
rejected.  Their reasoning was: 
“Some have suggested that a pricing system should also reward stages in the 
innovative process –‘innovation in itself’ – over and above clinically beneficial 
outcomes. In practice, this would mean that a pricing scheme would recognise, in 
prices, any drug making a major step forward in treating a serious disease (for 
example by pioneering the pharmacological mechanism) even if it were ultimately 
ineffective (or at least no more effective than alternatives) and subsequent 
technological leaps were required before a clinically useful product could be 
achievable. 
However, it is unlikely to be possible to define any meaningful pricing system 
that could address this problem. Such a system would call for a great number of 
discretionary awards based on suppositions about companies’ chances of success 
against many – potentially esoteric – scientific challenges with no clinical 
outcomes. It would therefore not only be inefficient for the NHS to spend 
money on ineffective drugs that could be allocated to fund proven medicines 
for patients with other conditions, it would also fail to provide transparent, 
clear investment incentives to companies.” (OFT 2007, Bold in the original 
report) 
 
Issue 2: Additional incentives for innovation are highly questionable 
Even if the OFT argument is rejected, it is not clear why VBP should be considered an 
appropriate mechanism for stimulating innovation in the development of pharmaceutical 
products.  The reasons for this are 4-fold: 
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a) Innovation is currently stimulated/rewarded through patents (i.e. monopoly status) 
and research and development (R&D) tax credits. 
b) There are plans for a massive stimulus through a ‘patent box’ whereby the rate of 
corporation tax on profits relating to UK-based patents will be set at a rate of 
10%, as opposed to the general rate of corporation tax of 27% (Her Majesty’s 
Revue and Customs 2010).  In steady state, the cost of the patent box to Her 
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and, conversely, the size of the 
stimulus to innovation is estimated to be £1.1 billion per annum (HM Treasury 
2010).  Putting aside the debate as to whether this is over- or under-stimulus, it is 
felt that such approaches are more appropriate as they are not taken from the 
budget of a single service such as the NHS.  If it is argued that innovation has 
spillover effects into the general economy through its creation of knowledge, 
exports and wealth, then policies aimed at stimulating innovation are best shared 
across all sectors of the economy.  
c) Most aspects of innovation that are identified in the literature are already captured 
by cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) through their impact on costs and quality 
adjusted life years (QALYs).  Take two examples; improved side-effects profiles 
and improved compliance due to more convenient administration.  Improved side-
effects profiles are included within current CEAs through increased QALYs (due 
to reduced utility reductions) and reduced costs (due to reduced medical 
intervention).  Improved compliance is included through increased QALYs due to 
increased effectiveness.  Whilst there may be room for improvement in the way in 
which some of these aspects are incorporated within the QALY model, there is 
little doubt that they can be incorporated. 
d) It is difficult to envisage how an adjustment to a price in the UK to encourage the 
development of products with specific characteristics that the Department of 
Health deem are innovative, will change the R&D portfolio of multi-national 
pharmaceutical companies;  the UK represents around 3.5% of global 
pharmaceutical revenues (Department of Health 2010). The DH’s Impact 
Assessment (2010) that accompanies the consultation recognises that “…a single 
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small country cannot, by its actions, have a significant effect on the global 
incentives to invest in R&D”.  Its own analyses show how VBP incentivisation 
can lead to net losses to the UK (p38, IA 2010) due to benefits being shared 
globally, but with the cost being borne in the UK only. 
 
3. The role and meaning of lambda 
The basic approach being proposed is to adjust the funding threshold (typically referred 
to as lambda, λ) in line with weightings associated with selected benefits provided by 
new medicines.  This will produce multiple thresholds intended to reflect a broader range 
of relevant benefits.  For a given set of ‘broader factors’ a threshold is identified and the 
price is set accordingly. 
The consultation document states that “the price threshold structure is determined as 
follows:  
• there would be a basic threshold, reflecting the benefits displaced elsewhere in the 
NHS when funds are allocated to new medicines;  
• there would be higher thresholds for medicines that tackle diseases where there is 
greater “burden of illness”: the more the medicine is focused on diseases with 
unmet need or which are particularly severe, the higher the threshold;  
• there would be higher thresholds for medicines that can demonstrate greater 
therapeutic innovation and improvements (I&I) compared with other products;  
• there would be higher thresholds for medicines that can demonstrate wider 
societal benefits.” 
Consultation Document, p13 
 
Issue 3: Multiple thresholds are nonsensical and ignore the added benefits displaced 
The development of multiple thresholds obscures the meaning of the threshold.  As 
recognised in the above quotation, λ represents the value of displaced activity.  These 
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activities do not necessarily change according to the characteristics of the new medicine 
(although it is recognised that lambda can vary systematically by therapeutic area (Martin 
et al 2008)). 
Additionally, if other costs and benefits are to be factored into the funding decision, then 
they need to be incorporated into the evaluation of the new medicine and the displaced 
activities. So, if the benefit weighting for ‘severe illness’ is twice that of ‘mild illness’, 
the threshold should not necessarily be doubled.  This would only be true if all the 
displaced activity were for mild illness.  It is likely that the displaced activity will 
represent a mix of disease severities, innovation and wider effects.  Consequently, 
lambda needs to change to recognise the socially weighted value of the displaced activity.  
This re-weighing would also need to be applied to the ‘basic threshold’ (using the 
terminology of the consultation document). 
The consultation document alludes to the correct meaning of lambda and highlights that 
using multiple thresholds is equivalent to adding in the benefits to appraisal of the new 
medicine.  This is misleading; it is only equivalent if a lambda is set that appropriately 
includes the social value of the displaced activity and the weightings used to generate the 
additional thresholds are relative to the characteristics of the displaced activity. 
A more preferable approach would be to estimate a socially weighted lambda and keep 
this fixed (thus retaining the true meaning of the threshold), but to apply weights to the 
outcome measure in the CEA.  If the benefit weighting for ‘severe illness’ is twice that of 
‘mild illness’, then 1 QALY gained by treating a severe illness can be expressed as 2 
severity-weighted-QALYs gained. 
 
4. Adjusting the threshold to reflect burden of illness 
The first thing to note regarding this factor is that ‘burden of illness’ is not being used in 
its conventional epidemiological sense, that is, the total amount of ill health for a 
population; it is the burden of illness for an individual.  In its epidemiological sense, 
burden increases with the prevalence of the condition.  As such, it is unclear how burden 
of illness is defined for the purposes of the VBP. 
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The document states that the most important factors relating to burden of illness are 
severity of the condition and level of unmet need.  As an example of how this could be 
operationalised, the consultation document suggests that severity could reflect health 
status, could be assessed by QALY loss and unmet need could reflect existing treatments.  
Whilst this is fine in principle, if there is to be an empirical basis for the adjustment, there 
are two important problems that need resolving that are discussed below (Issues 4 and 5). 
 
Issue 4: Focusing on an individual patient characteristic without reference to others, 
risks unexpected policy implications 
Let’s assume burden of illness is operationalised using the example in the consultation 
document (and given in the preceding paragraph).  However, is QALY loss (a) the 
inability to have ‘normal’ health status for their disease-specific life expectancy, or (b) 
their inability to have a ‘normal’ health status and ‘normal’ age-specific life expectancy? 
If it is (a), unmet need (and hence, price) is small for patients with short disease-specific 
life expectancies.  If it is (b), unmet need (and hence, price) will be greatest for diseases 
that reduce life expectancy in younger people, and in essence, it would operationalise a 
notion of ‘fair innings’ equity (Williams 1997).  
For both such definitions, treatments for kidney cancer may receive a low priority; 
disease-specific life expectancy is short and due to the age profile of the patient group 
(which has a median age of around 65), the normal age-specific life expectancy is not 
large.  Yet, treatments for kidney cancer are currently supported through both the 
supplementary end-of-life guidance within the NICE TA process and from the additional 
funds within the Cancer Fund.  
These unexpected results are caused by focussing on a single marker of ‘deservedness’ 
(e.g. unmet need) without reference to other related markers of ‘deservedness’ (e.g. life 
expectancy) that people may have preferences over.  This highlights that for any given 
definition of unmet need, the derivation of weights must be considered in relation to 
related concepts (i.e. unmet need as measured by QALYs are necessarily related to 
quality of life and age-specific life expectancy).  Whilst this interdependency is 
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recognised within the Impact Assessment (IA 2010, p18), it appears to be ignored within 
the consultation document. 
 
Issue 5:  Best methods are not known 
Whilst several studies have attempted to identify the relative value of additional factors 
related to treatments, there is no consensus on what the best approach is to estimating the 
relative values despite a long history of attempts, including two NICE funded studies 
(Baker et al 2008, Dolan et al 2008). 
These studies appear to demonstrate large framing effects that impact on the results and 
even when the results appear intuitive in terms of their ordering, the absolute estimates 
appear extreme (Baker et al 2008, Dolan et al 2008).  In a review of social preferences 
Nord identified 200-fold differences in some weightings (Nord 2001).  The policy 
implications of such weightings would be dramatic. 
Consequently, any attempt to produce weightings will require a large scoping study to 
pilot empirical studies.  It is also possible that the results may need to be moderated if 
they are considered to be invalid or implausible.  Obtaining consensus on these methods 
will be vitally important if VBP is to be successful. 
 
5. Adjusting the threshold to reflect therapeutic innovation and improvement 
There appears to be little justification for rewarding innovation in its own right (Issue 1) 
and we have also highlighted that innovation is already rewarded four times through 
patent, R&D tax credits, patent box and inclusion within current methods of cost-
effectiveness (Issue 2).  The NICE Decision Support Unit (DSU) has also undertaken 
further analysis to demonstrate why further reward for innovation is not justified (Claxton 
et al 2009). 
So, is there anything new relating to the proposals that has not been considered 
previously?  One issue that has not received a great deal of interest is the notion that 
additional value should be given to medicines that demonstrate a ‘step change’ in the 
treatment of a particular illness.  The reasoning behind rewarding step-change appears to 
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be three-fold.  Firstly, to disincentivise the production of ‘me-too’ formulations and as 
such focus attention on novel compounds.  Secondly, it could be argued that society 
values large changes in utility/QALYs greater than small changes. Thirdly, ‘step 
changes’ indicate innovation.  We will not address the third point here as this has been 
previously discussed. 
 
Issue 6: VBP will disincentivise ‘me-toos’ without this adjustment 
When the first formulation within a new class of drugs is produced, it is rewarded with a 
patent.  Subsequent drugs will also benefit from patents, but as value is assessed relative 
to all other drugs, including the first formulation, their potential profitability will be 
reduced as the first formulation will go generic before their patent period has been 
completed.  As such, the need for further adjustments to disincentivise ‘me-toos’ as part 
of VBP is questionable. 
Take golimumab for instance.  It is currently being appraised by NICE for use in 
rheumatoid arthritis.  It is the most recent in a long line of ‘biologics’.  The first drug in 
this class – etanercept – comes off patent in 2012 and as such, any generic formation of 
this will reduce the value based price of the entire class regardless of their patent details, 
thereby limiting their profitability.  The manufacturers of etanercept were well rewarded 
for its therapeutic innovation and improvement.  However, golimumab, could in essence 
only receive 2 years of premium pricing.1
 
 
Issue 7: Valuing large gains more than small gains limits access to new medicines  
The notion of society valuing big health gains more than small health gains is plausible.  
So, if faced with a choice of treating 1,000 patients with drug ‘x’ that produces (on 
average) a 1 QALY gain per patient, and treating 100 patients with drug ‘y’ that produces 
10 additional QALYs per patient, it could be argued that society would prefer funding 
drug ‘x’ due to its larger gains (even though the same number of QALYs are produced).  
                                                 
1 We recognise that generic formulation of biologic therapies have particular issues with respect to 
manufacturing and regulation which may complicate this specific example.  
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A consequence of this, of course, is that fewer patients will have access to a new and 
effective treatment.   
Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that, provided the size of the benefit per patient 
is over a (as yet unidentified) threshold, people prefer to disperse the overall benefit of a 
drug to a larger number of patients than to concentrate it to a smaller number of people 
(Rodríguez-Míguez, Pinto-Prades, 2002; Dolan et al, 2008). 
  
6. Adjusting the threshold for wider societal factors 
Issue 8: Very few of these factors are mentioned in the consultation document, and as 
such, it is difficult to comment on the proposals. 
We attempt to examine the issues relating to the incorporation of wider societal factors by 
listing those wider effects that have been prominent in the literature (for example, 
Kanavos and colleagues 2010): 
• Informal carer costs and quality of life.  Carer health-related quality of life is 
already included within the NICE reference case. 
• Societal perspective on costs.  By definition, this includes informal carer costs.  It 
also includes production losses, for which there is no agreed method of valuation 
(although this in itself should not prevent it being included). 
Such an approach is also consistent with including the health care costs in added 
years of life.  Currently, the status of costs not directly attributable to the 
treatment under consideration is unclear.  In some appraisals, the cost of 
treatments incurred in the additional years of life produced by the new drug have 
been excluded, for example, in the appraisal of cinacalcet (NICE 2007).  There is 
little sense including costs to all other sectors and the broader economy, but then 
excluding some of the costs falling on the health service. 
• Externalities.  It can be argued that some benefits of health care production have 
benefits that fall beyond this process.  Knowledge/spillover is frequently cited; 
however, it is unclear how much of this is not captured by the manufacturer (and 
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as such helps generate future medicines at lower cost, thereby increasing profit).  
A caring externality can be envisaged, such that the treatment of certain diseases 
is seen as a moral imperative, or generates ‘warm glow’ in non-patients.  Three 
issues are noted with this.  Firstly, such externalities may well exist in the 
displaced activities, too.  Secondly, some essence of this may well be 
incorporated within the proposed burden of illness weightings. Thirdly, it is not 
clear to what extent such values should be valued and included within public 
policy analysis (Milgrom 1993). 
• Process utility.  This can be included within the current CEA framework.  For 
example, work has been published that has examined the utility decrement 
associated with medication frequency/flexibility (Boye 2010) and surgery (Cook 
1994). 
 
Whilst it is difficult to make precise comment on factors that have not been identified, it 
should be recognised that a cost-utility framework can accommodate many of the wider 
benefits mentioned in the literature.  A wider valuation and costing perspective is not the 
death knell of cost-utility analysis (CUA); it is merely a change to the decision problem 
to which CUA can be applied.  
 
7. Other issues not raised in the consultation document 
Issue 9: Uncertainty is not recognised within the approach outlined 
The evidence on which a price is to be determined is inherently uncertain and this needs 
to be considered within the pricing decision.  The issue of uncertainty relating to the 
ICER has been examined in detail by Claxton and colleagues (2011).  They highlight the 
fact that the value of collecting further evidence should be considered by decision makers 
as this may exceed the incremental benefits of a new technology.  Additionally, they 
argue that the typical framework for economic evaluation masks the profile of costs, such 
that if access is limited in the future, prior to the full benefits of an intervention being 
realised, the drug would not be considered cost-effective as all the up-front costs will 
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already have been borne by the NHS.  Incorporation of these two effects may have the 
effect of reducing the price at which a drug is considered to be good value. 
However, it should also be recognised that the evidence on which the categorisation of 
the medicine/population into different levels of burden of illness, innovation and wider 
effects will also be uncertain.  It is not clear how this will be factored into the proposed 
framework; presumably, a medicine/population can either be ascribed a particular 
threshold, or not, which will then be open to appeal.  If, instead, burden of illness, 
innovation and wider effects were included within the ICER, a clear framework exists by 
which the uncertainty can be described and incorporated within the analysis (NICE 
2008). 
 
Issue 10: It is unclear how combination drug regimens will be evaluated 
When a drug is licensed in combination with another (or several others), its price will 
partly be determined by the incremental gain in QALYs associated with it.  However, 
disentangling the marginal effect of one drug from that of several others may not be 
straight forward; A vs A+B is the simplest example, with the manufacturers of B 
claiming the full additive incremental effect, but the manufacturers of A may claim a 
synergistic effect. 
 
8. Conclusion 
The shift from the PPRS to VBP is an important huge change in the way that medicines 
will be priced, and consequently, reimbursed in the United Kingdom.  The current system 
of pricing is not based on the value of the benefits produced; the NICE TA process makes 
this assessment using a health maximisation framework based around health-related 
budgets and QALYs.  The NICE framework enables an assessment of whether the 
benefits of a new treatment are greater than the health losses associated with the 
displaced activities.   
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The need to assess the value of new interventions based on the characteristics of the 
displaced activities (e.g. the health produced) must remain.  To a large extent, all that is 
changing under VBP is the characteristics being considered.  The current system balances 
health gains (from the new medicine) with health losses (from the displaced activities).  
The new system should balance socially-valued health gain and wider benefits (from the 
new medicine) with socially-valued health losses and wider negative impact (from the 
displaced activities). 
 
As well as emphasising this need to recognise the value of displaced activities we have 
also drawn attention to problems with yet further reward for innovation, difficulties in 
estimating preference weights, the need to recognise uncertainty and problems of double 
counting when not clearly defining the various benefits to be valued.  We have also 
highlighted areas where a cost-utility framework, contrary to some claims, is capable of 
addressing wider benefits, for example, innovative features of drugs, disincentivisation of 
‘me-toos’ and incorporation of wider impacts. 
 
So, whilst the opportunity to purchase new medicines based on value to society is one 
that should be welcomed, we should proceed with caution.  The underlying decision rule 
on which value should be based should not change, nor should a cost-utility framework 
be totally abandoned just because its current formulation does not match the wider 
perspective now craved by government.  However, the immediate challenge will involve 
identifying methods to assess social values in a robust manner; twenty years of research 
has not produced a preferred method, yet we have less than three to derive a suitable set 
of weights. 
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